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ARGUMENT 
At bottom, the issue in this case is whether it can actually be determined 
what the jury decided at the conclusion of trial in this matter. The jury's decision 
is critical, because the awards found by the jury are the foundation for who is the 
"successful party" in the case. Pursuant to Utah statute, the successful party is 
entitled to recover their costs and attorney fees. 
The Smedsmds in their Brief Of Appellees do not address the authority 
cited by Pochynok which discusses the need for an unambiguous jury verdict. 
Instead, the Smedsmds simply reargue what has formerly been submitted to the 
trial court, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. The Smedsruds continue to 
speculate on what the jury may have decided in this case and thereafter base all of 
their arguments on this speculation. The only clear issue in this case, however, is 
that the jury awarded Pochynok $7,076.56. 
While the Smedsruds have postulated that the jury must have based its 
verdict upon certain offsets to Pochynok's claims, such a position can only be 
founded on rank speculation. The question that neither the parties, the trial court, 
nor the appellate courts have been able to answer with any degree of certainty 
based upon the current status of this case is: "What factors did the jury actually 
take into account in rendering its verdict in this matter?" Without knowing the 
basis for and the full meaning of the jury's verdict, justice cannot be reached in 
this case. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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AMBIGUITY OF THE JURY VERDICT 
A verdict must import a definite meaning free from any ambiguity. Penny 
v. State, 155 So. 576 (Ala. 1934); Campbell v. Kelley, 719 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 
1986); Fischer v. Howard, 111 P.2d 1059 (Or. 1954); Lorick & Lowrance v. Julius 
K Walker & Co., 150 S.E.789 (S.C. 1929). Fundamental justice requires that a 
verdict returned by a jury be free from inconsistency. Sanchez v. Martinez, 99 
N.M. 66, 653 P.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1982). Jury verdicts are inconsistent when they 
are so contradictory that they cannot be construed with certainty or when they 
camiot fairly be resolved as a definite finding in favor of either party. Franklin v. 
Allstate, 985 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1999). Moreover, it is the duty of a 
trial judge not to receive an indefinite, imperfect, or ambiguous verdict, and to 
cause the jury to retire and put their verdict in proper form after proper instructions 
from the court. White v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 350 S.E.2d 788 (1986). 
It is significant to note that each of the parties herein submitted proposed 
special verdict forms to the trial court for submission to the jury. Rather than 
using or adapting either of these proposed forms, the trial court used a simple 
general verdict form. After the jury reached its verdict, neither the trial court nor 
the Smedsmds asked for any clarification from the jury before the panel was 
released. 
As mentioned above, other jurisdictions have found that a trial court has a 
duty to insure that any verdict rendered by the jury in unambiguous. Moreover, if 
the Smedsruds had issues with what factors were considered by the jury in arriving 
9 
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at its verdict, they should have raised those issues with the trial court before the 
jury was released so that the issues the Smedsmds now raise concerning any 
offsets to Pochynok's claims could have been resolved. In fact, Utah case law has 
established that under Rule 47, U. R. Civ. P., when an insufficient verdict is 
rendered, counsel has the opportunity to assert an objection and the trial court 
under Rule 47 may return the jury for further deliberation with further instructions 
to correct the iiTegularity, but if counsel does not avail itself of such oppoitunity 
his objection to iiTegularity of the verdict is waived. Langton v. International 
Transport, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971). Here, no such 
inquiry on whether offsets were actually considered by the jury was made by 
either the trial court or the Smedruds' counsel. As a result, we are left with the 
situation where no one can know, or ever know, exactly what factors were 
considered by the jury in arriving at its verdict. 
When the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals remanded this 
case to the trial court for a factual determination of awards and offsets, the trial 
court requested that the parties submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Significantly, on the same date the trial court received the Smedruds' 
proposed findings and conclusions, the trial court adopted the same as its findings 
and conclusions. Pochynok was afforded no opportunity to file any objections to 
the same. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that it does not recommend that a 
trial judge "mechanically adopt" the findings and conclusions as prepared by the 
"prevailing party". Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1977). This is 
especially true when no opportunity is provided to the other party to file objections 
and/or proposed amendments to such findings and conclusions and to argue the 
same to the court. While the trial court does have discretion in the adoption of 
findings and conclusions, such adoption should only be made when the findings 
and conclusions are clearly not contrary to the evidence. The findings and 
conclusions entered by the trial court in this case, however, are not based on any 
evidence because it is unknown at this late date what the factors were that the jury 
based its decision on. (A well written discussion of the inherent difficulties that 
can result from the mechanical adoption of proposed findings and conclusions is 
contained in Compton v. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861 (Idaho 1977) a copy of which is 
included in the addendum to this brief.) 
The Smedsruds proposed findings and conclusions (which were adopted by 
the trial court), only set forth precise amounts that they claim were asserted at trial. 
The Smedsruds asserted $40,050.49 in claimed offsets. If this position is accepted 
as accurate, and assuming the jury found these asserted offsets to be valid, it must 
also be true that Pochynok was successful on at least $47,127.05 of its claims (the 
sum of the claimed offset of $40,050.49, plus the $7,076.56 which the jury 
actually awarded). At trial Pochynok sought recovery of $36,258.62 for fees due 
to Pochynok and $20,542.95 for amounts due to its subcontractors. Interest in the 
A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
amount of $24,464.34 was also included in the $81,269.91 Pochynok claimed was 
due and owing. (R. 412) As a substantial amount of interest was included in the 
amount Pochynok claimed it was owed, the $81,269.91 figure (which the 
Smedsruds repeatedly state is outlandish) is somewhat misleading. When interest 
is deducted, the amount Pochynok was seeking totaled $56,805.56. Based upon 
the trial court's own numbers, Pochynok must have been successful on a 
substantial portion of its claims or at least $47,125.05 of the $56,805.56 
(excluding interest) it was seeldng. Notwithstanding that even based on its own 
numbers Pochynok was necessarily successful on a large part of its claims, the 
trial court did not even take into account, let alone balance, Pochynok's successes 
at trial and instead awarded the Smedsruds with a complete and clean win. 
The trial court's numbers, however, do not even make sense and certainly 
do not explain how the jury's verdict was reached. They are the result of pure 
conjecture. Moreover, there are countless equally viable but uncertain and 
unsupportable scenarios which could be suggested to arrive at the jury verdict 
figure, each of which scenarios, if improvidently accepted as true, could 
substantially impact the prevailing party determination in this case. The only way 
to reach a proper conclusion in this case is to remand this case for a new trial using 
a special verdict form which fully and completely sets forth the relative awards 
and offsets found by the jury. Otherwise, the prevailing party determination will 
necessarily be based on rank speculation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Pochynok respectfully requests that this Court 
set aside the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law for the reason 
that the same are based on speculation, and order a new trial in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JJ_ day of September, 2006 
lartmeau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief Of 
Appellant was served upon the following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, 
postage prepaid, to said individuals at the following address this fr day of 
September, 2006. 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
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P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444 
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• ••• COMPTON v, 
Cite as 560 
98 Idaho 190 • 
Robert W, COMPTON, 
Plaintiff- Appellant, 
Martha It, Compton GILMORE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 12058. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Feb. 25, 1977. 
The District Court, Second Judicial Dis-
trict, Latah County,. Roy E. Mosman, J., 
entered order modifying decree of divorce 
and ordering noncustodial father to "re-
frain from providing formal religious train-
ing" for his five-year-old daughter while 
exercising.his visitation rights, and father 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Bistline, J., 
held that where there was no finding that 
unusual behavior child exhibited after visits 
with her father was in any way caused by 
the _religious differences of the parents and 
where record did not indicate any compel-
ling, reasons justifying exception to general 
rule that courts should not interfere in reli-
gious matters, order that father refrain 
from providing formal religious training for 
his daughter was erroneously and improvi-
dently entered; and that trial court did not 
abuse ?ts discretion in limiting father's visi-
tation to one weekend per month, six weeks 
in the summer, and alternating holidays. 
Order modifying final divorce decree 
reversed and remanded with directions. 
1. Infants <^ 19.2(5), 19.3(4) 
Generally, courts should maintain atti-
tude of strict impartiality between religions 
and should not disqualify any applicant for 
child custody or restrain any person having 
custody or visitation rights from taking 
children to a particular church, except 
where there is a clear and affirmative 
showing that the conflicting religious be-
liefs affect general welfare of child. 
2. Trial <fc=>394(l) 
While a trial court may avail itself of 
assistance of counsel with respect to find-
, GILMORE Idaho 861 
P.2d861 
ings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial 
judge, in all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury, should find the facts spe-
cially and state separately his conclusions of 
law thereon and direct entry of the appro-
priate judgment. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 52(a). 
3. Divorce ^303(2) 
Where, on wife's motion seeking to re-
duce non-custodial husband's visitation 
rights, no finding was made that child's 
unusual behavior exhibited after visits with 
her father was in any way caused by reli-
gious differences of the parents and where 
record did not indicate any compelling rea-
sons justifying any exception to general 
rule that courts should not interfere in reli-
gious matters, trial court's order, insofar as 
it ordered husband to refrain from provid-
ing formal religious training for daughter, 
was erroneously and improvidently entered. 
I.C. § 32-705. 
L Divorce «=>303(4) 
On wife's motion to reduce visitation 
rights of non-custodial husband, trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in limiting hus-
band's visitation to one weekend per month, 
six weeks in the summer, and alternating 
holidays, 
Robert S. Williams, Moscow, for plaintiff-
appellant. 
Allen V. Bowles, Moscow, for defendant-
respondent. 
BISTLINE, Justice. 
This appeal raises a challenge to an order 
modifying a final divorce decree whereby a 
father was enjoined from providing reli-
gious training to his five year old daughter. 
We reverse that order. 
Robert and Martha Compton were mar-
ried in October, 1961, and have one child, 
Kari, born on April 22,1969. Robert (plain-
tiff-appellant) was granted a default di-
vorce in December of 1971, with the court-
awarding custody of Kari to her mother, 
Martha, and, as also requested, t(50% visita-
tion rights" to her father, Robert 
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In October of 1972, Martha (defendant-
respondent) moved for a modification, 
alleging difficulties in interpreting the 
"50%" language. A hearing was held two 
weeks later; and the decree was modified 
leaving custody in Martha, with Robert's 
visitation set at three weekends and one 
midweek visitation per month. 
In the following month, November of 
1972, Martha, without consulting Robert, 
made the decision that it was in Kari's best 
interest for Kari to live with Robert, who 
was by then married to Marilyn; Kari then 
lived with Robert and Marilyn with Martha 
having such visitation as she deemed prop-
er. All of the foregoing was accomplished 
without asking for any court guidance or 
approval. 
In the spring of 1974, however, Martha 
made a new decision; this was that Kari 
would be better off living with her; in 
August of 1974 Kari was later returned to 
Martha. Meanwhile, Martha has been liv-
ing with Todd Gilmore. 
On November 6, 1974, Martha (not yet 
Gilmore) filed a new motion seeking to cut 
Robert's visitation down to one 30-hour 
weekend per month, and one summer 
month, primarily alleging her belief that it 
would be better for Kari if Robert's visita-
tions were confined to what she thought 
had been reasonable when she had been the 
visiting parent. Eight days after the filing, 
Todd and Martha culminated their two-year 
courtship with a marriage ceremony, A 
hearing on Martha's motions followed three 
weeks after her marriage to Todd Gilmore. 
An order was entered on February 10, 1975 
(amended on March 19, 1975), limiting Rob-
ert's visitation to the one weekend per 
month, six weeks in the summer, and alter-
nating holidays. 
Two months later Robert filed his motion 
claiming a material change in circumstanc-
es due to his imminent move to Boise. He 
requested extended holiday and visitation 
rights, this to be in lieu of his one-a-month 
weekend visits, Martha filed an opposing 
affidavit in wrhich she alleged that conduct 
on Robert's part tended to undermine her 
relation with Kari. She contended that 
Kari was "receiving input from plaintiff 
(Robert) which results in her becoming tem-
porarily antagonistic toward defendant 
(Martha) and causing Kari to question de-
fendant's basic goodness." This affidavit 
goes on to say that such was evidenced by, 
among other things, a remark of little Kari: 
"You and Todd (Mr, Gilmore) are walking 
away from God." 
Robert's motion was heard in July of 
1975, and an order entered on August 2, 
1975, in which his future visitation and 
phone call rights were spelled out in the 
minutest detail. The order specified that 
each party "refrain from ever speaking to 
Kari about the other parent in a derogatory 
manner." 
Robert was also ordered to "refrain from 
providing formal religious training for Kari 
Compton," and the entry of such order he 
assigns as error, challenging it as in viola-
tion of his (and Kari's) right to freedom of 
speech and of religion as provided in both 
the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
Robert argues that the restraining order is 
too vague and ambiguous to be understood, 
much less to be enforced by a contempt 
'citation, and thus a violation of his right to 
due process of law. 
Martha argues that, by statute, the court 
is empowered to address all issues relating 
to the child's care and welfare, I.C. § 3 2 -
705; she contends that Robert's constitu-
tional right to freedom of speech and reli-
gion is outweighed when it comes in con-
flict with.the State's interest in the welfare 
of the child. She argues further that the 
court order is not constitutionally vague 
since its meaning, construed in light of the 
whole record, is clear, She argues that: 
"The Court's order requires the appellant 
to restrict the meetings that Kari Comp-
ton is taken to and to restrain the signifi-
cance which appellant places on the reli-
gious aspects of his home life while Kari 
Compton is present" 
We find no need to reach such lofty consti-
tutional questions, The record is uncontra-
dicted that prior to the hearing in. Decem-
ber of 1974, Martha had never complained, 
or even intimated to Robert that his reli-
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COMPTON.v 
Cite as 560 
gious guidance of Kari was creating a prob-
lem of any kind. Religion went entirely 
unmentioned by the court either in oral 
remarks on the conclusion of testimony or 
in the order emanating from that hearing. 
In her affidavit opposing Robert's re-
quest for better summer and holiday visita-
tion rights, Martha was quick to assure the 
court that "the additional time Kari has 
spent at home since December 10, 1974, has 
helped eliminate the confusion as to who 
are authority figures in her life." Kari's 
supposed "guilt" feelings and her supposed 
"bizarre" behavior after visits with her fa-
ther were by Martha attributed to the very 
fact that there were such visits, and also to 
Robert's supposed indiscreet discussion of 
parental conflicts—but never as to religious 
indoctrination on his part In their plead-
ings, neither party made any issue.regard-
ing the other's role in Kari's upbringing, 
religious, as to Robert, or nonreligious, as to 
Martha, 
At the July, 1975, hearing virtually all 
testimony on the topic of religion was elicit-
ed by the court, and this only after the 
court overruled an objection by Robert's 
counsel when Martha's counsel touched 
upon it in examining her. As between the 
parties, the testimony showed that there 
had been only one communication on the 
subject. Thereafter, according to Robert^ 
uncontradicted, testimony,, "she. (Martha) 
has not made any other effort to: interfere 
with my relationship with my.child as far as 
religion goes/' 
Early in this hearing, the court an-
nounced: 
"So that I don't forget what * I am going 
to do in this final order, I am going to 
order.you now to refrain from that kind 
.of religious training of the child when * 
she is. with you." 
Robert immediately inquired, "Could.you be 
explicit on that?" and the court replied, "I 
will be." However, during concluding re-
marks, the court said only: "You're going 
to have to cool it a bit about religion when 
she is with you I can't be more 
specific than that." 
, GILMORE Idaho 86.3, 
P.2d86J 
Various recommendations regarding reli-
gious training were then made to both par-
ents, but the court remarked, "that is not 
an order. It is just a recommendation to 
you." . And the. court explicitly stated: 
"I can't tell you not to take her to church 
. . I don't feel it. would be right 
to order you not to go to church when she 
is in your home." 
[1] The bench expressions of the trial 
court were proper and wholly in accord 
with the salutary genera! rule applicable to 
this type of situation, which we observe, to 
have been well stated by the Washington 
Supreme Court as follows: 
"Thus the rule appears to be well estab-
lished that the court should maintain an. 
attitude of strict impartiality between re-
ligions and should not disqualify any ap-
plicant for custody or restrain any person 
having custody or visitation rights from, 
taking the children to a particular church, 
except where there is a clear and affirm-
ative showing that the conflicting reli-
gious beliefs affect the general welfare 
of the child. . , , Where the trial 
court does not follow the generally estab-
lished rule of noninterference in religious 
matters in child custody cases without an 
affirmative showing of compelling rea-
sons for such action, we are of the opin^ 
ion that this is tantamount to a manifest 
abuse of "discretion." Mu'noz v. Munoz, 79 
Washed 810, 489'P.2d 1133, 1135 (1971).. 
Here, there had been no such ''affirmative 
showing that the conflicting, religious be-
lief s.. af feci ' the general welfare of the 
child.", Indeed, the court's sole relevant 
finding of fact was that the child exhibited 
"strange," "unusual" and "aggressive be-
havior" after visits with her father. No 
finding was made that such behavior was in 
any way caused by the religious differences 
of the parents. 
Nor would this record support a finding 
of any, "compelling reasons".^ to justify an 
exception to the general rule of noninter-
ference. Such i-easons typically are found 
only in situations where "there is a serious 
danger to the life or health of. a child as a 
result of the religious views of a parent." 
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Stapley v. Stapley 15 Ariz.App. 64, 485 P,2d 
1181, 1187 (1971), 
Had the trial court not delegated his fact-
finding'processes to counsel, it is doubted 
that the order under challenge and necessi-
tating this appeal would have been entered. 
Clearly the trial court, in his bench re-
marks, expressed a different view after 
first stating such an order would be en-
tered. 
[2] Some trial judges make their own 
findings and conclusions, but others dele-
gate that duty. We call attention of bench 
and bar alike to a statement we recently 
made: 
"IRCP 52(a) requires the judge in all 
actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury to 'find the facts specially and state 
separately [his] conclusions of law there-
on and direct the entry.kof the appropriate 
judgment'/' In re Estate of Stibor, 96 
Idaho 162, 168, 525 P.2d 357, 358 (1974), 
Therein we quoted approvingly from the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico in Mora v. 
Martinez, 80 N.M. 88, 451 P,2d 992, 993-4 
(1969): 
"'[We] take note of the fact that, al-
though our Rule 52 differs from the fed-
eral rule, nevertheless the reasons for 
both rules are the same, i. e., as an aid to 
the appellate court by placing before it 
the basis of the decision of the trial court; 
to require' care en the part of the trial 
judge in his consideration and adjudica-
tion of the facts ; and for the purposes of 
res judicata and estoppel by judgment. 
[Citing Barron & Holtzoff and Moore,]7" 
(Emphasis added.) In re Estate of 
Stibor, 96 Idaho at 163-64, 525 ,P.2d 357 
at- 358, 
The New Mexico court in Mora continued " 
on from the above passage with the follow-
ing: 
"We agree with the federal cases which, 
without exception, require adequate find-
ings and insist on the exercise of an inde-
pendent judgment on the part of the trial 
judge in making his own findings of fact 
rather than adopting those of one of the 
parties. See, among others, Edward 
Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works. Inc., 
289 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1961); and United 
States v, Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (2d 
Cir, 1942); as well as Featherstone v, 
Barashf 845 F,2d 246, 249 (10th Cir. 1965), 
where the court aptly stated: 
'Proper and adequate findings of fact 
are not only mandatory, but highly 
practical and salutory in the adminis-
tration of justice. It has been pointed 
out that the trial court is a most impor-
tant agency of the judicial branch of 
the government precisely because on it 
rests the responsibility of ascertaining 
the facts. The Supreme Court recently 
underscored the responsibility of the 
court with respect to findings, and was 
critical of any indiscriminate depend-
ence upon counsel in formulating them. 
(Citing United States v. El "Paso Natu-
ral Gas Co., et-a/./376'U;S. 651, 84-S.Gt. 
1044, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964)); Whatever 
difficulties there may. be under various 
circumstances in the application of the 
'clearly erroneous' rule in support of 
the trial court's findings, these difficul-
ties are immeasurably compounded by 
dubious findings. And when findings 
wholly fail to resolve in any meaning-
ful way the basic issues of fact in dis-
pute, they become clearly insufficient 
to permit the reviewing court to decide 
the case at all, except to remand it for 
proper findings by the trial court/" 
(Emphasis added.) Mora v, Martinez, 
451 P.2d at 994, 
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Company, 376 U.S. 651, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 12 
L,Ed.2d 12 (1964), the United States Su-
preme Court was faced with 130 findings of 
fact and one conclusion of law which had 
been drafted by the winning counsel .'and 
adopted verbatim by the district court. 
The Supreme Court voiced its dissatisfac-
tion with this practice,-quoting approvingly 
from the advice given by Judge J, Skelly 
Wright in his "Seminars for Newly Ap-
pointed United States District Judges": 
"Who shall prepare the findings? Rule 
52 says the court shall prepare the find-
ings. 'The court shall find the facts spe-
cially and state separately its conclusions 
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of law/ We all know what has happened. 
Many courts simply decide the case in 
favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, 
have him prepare the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and sign them. This 
has been • denounced by every court of 
appeals save one. This is an abandon-
ment of the duty and the trust that has 
been placed in the judge by these rules. 
It is a noncompliance with Rule 52 specif-
ically and it betrays the primary purpose 
of Rule 52—the primary purpose being 
that the preparation of these findings by 
the judge shall assist in the adjudication 
of the lawsuit. 
"I suggest to you strongly that you avoid 
as far as you possibly can simply signing 
what some lawyer puts under your nose. 
These lawyers, and properly so, in' their 
zeal and advocacy and their enthusiasm 
are going to state the case for their side 
in these findings as strongly as .they pos-
sibly can. When these findings get to the 
courts of appeals they won't be worth the 
paper they are written on as far as assist-
ing the court of appeals in determining 
why the judge decided the case." 376 
U.S. at 656, 84 S.Ct. at 1047, n. 4. 
The point is not so much that winning 
counsel will be tempted to overreach. 
Rather, the practice undermines the entire 
judicial function itself. The point was 
made most clearly by Judge Maris, speaking 
for the Third Circuit; 
"Obviously- the judge must have dealt 
with the questions of fact and law in-
volved in the case in the course of the 
reasoning by which he has reached his 
ultimate conclusion, even though his rea-
soning has not been articulated and put 
on paper. But counsel who is called upon 
to articulate and write out the' findings 
and conclusions must do so without any 
knowledge of the fact findings and rea-
soning processes through which the judge 
has actually gone in reaching his decision. 
"We••••strongly disapprove this practice. 
For it not only imposes a well-nigh impos-
sible task upon counsel but also flies in 
the face of the spirit and purpose, if not 
the letter, of rule 52(a). The purpose of 
that rule is to require the trial judge to 
560 P.2d—)9 
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formulate and articulate his findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in the course 
of his consideration and determination of 
the case and as a part of his decision 
making process, so that he himself may 
be satisfied that he has dealt fully and 
properly with all the issues in the case 
before he decides it and so that the par-
ties involved and-.this court on appeal 
may be fully informed as to the bases of 
his decision when it is made. Findings 
and conclusions prepared ex post facto by 
counsel, even though signed by the judge, 
do not serve adequately the function con-
temphted by the rule. At most they 
provide the judge with an opportunity to 
reconsider the bases of his original deci-
sion but without affording the parties 
any information as to what those bases 
were or which.of them are being recon-
sidered. At worst they are likely to con-
vict the judge of error because, as here, 
they are inadequate to support his deci-
sion or because, as we have observed in 
other cases, they are loaded. down with 
argumentative overdetailed. partisan mat-
ter much of which is likely to be of doubt-
ful validity or even wholly without sup-
port in the record.5* (Emphasis added.) 
Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 751-52 (3d 
Cir. 1965). 
All-of this is not to say that a trial court 
may not avail itself of assistance of counsel. 
"The trial court:may invite counsel to 
submit proposed findings and conclusions 
of law. Indeed this practice 'is well es-
tablished as a valuable aid to decision 
making.1 Counsel have an obligation to 
aid the court by responding to such an 
invitation. Particularly in complex cases, 
involving technical or scientific issues,:the 
proposed findings may help the court to 
avoid error. 
"If the court plans to have the assistance 
of counsel with regard to the findings, 
the better practice is to request proposed 
findings prior to decision and to make the 
request of counsel for both sides. In this 
way each party may present findings set-
ting forth his theories and the evidence 
that he thinks supports . those theories. 
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The court may select the findings that 
are correct and reject those that are 
wrong. They may be restated in other 
language. The court is not required to 
rule specifically on the requests in mak-
ing its own findings. Proposed findings 
submitted by counsel are no more than 
informal suggestions for the assistance of 
the court. Indeed it is said in some cases 
that only those findings actually made by 
the court are part of the record on ap-
peal, though it may well be doubted 
whether this is in fact the rule." 9 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Pro-
cedure, § 2578 at 702-04 (1971). 
[3,4] We hold that the order of August 
8, 1975, insofar as it ordered Robert Comp-
ton to refrain from providing formal reli-
gious training for Kari Compton was erro-
neously and improvidently entered. On the 
matter of visitation, where one of the par-
ents is required to live at some distance 
from the residence of the custodial parent, 
see Dawson v. Dawson, 90 Idaho 234, 409 
P,2d 434 (1965),- The visitation rights af-
forded Robert by the court, while not raised 
directly by an Assignment of Error, do not 
appear to reflect any abuse of judicial dis-
cretion. 
Order modifying final decree reversed 
and remanded with directions to strike 
from the said Order of August 2, 1975, that 
portion which states:. "That plaintiff shall 
refrain from providing formal religious 
training for Kari Compton." In other re-
spects affirmed,. Costs to appellant. 
McFADDEN, C. J., and DONALDSON, 
SHEPARD and BAKES, JJ., concur. 
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Iver J. LONGETEIG, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Jack L» NEAL and Max Goodmiller, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 12052. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Feb. 25, 1977. 
Action was brought for collection of 
attorney fees allegedly earned in defending 
defendants in previous litigation involving 
collection of attorney fees. The District 
Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada Coun-
ty, Marion J, Callister, J., granted a motion 
to dismiss defendant's appeal from magis-
trates court, and defendants appealed. The 
Supreme Court held that since 1975 amend-
ments to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which required for the first time the filing 
of a cost bond within ten days in order to 
perfect an appeal from magistrates court to 
district court, were unavailable to. appel-
lants at time they prepared their pro se 
appeal, on July 14, 1975, from magistrates 
court to district court, district court erred in 
applying strict requirement of new rule re-
quiring' cost bond within ten days, particu-
larly in view of fact that necessary appeal 
bond had been deposited, in cash, with clerk 
prior to time court ruled upon motion to 
dismiss appeal; and that Supreme Court-
would remand cause with directions to rein-
state appeal, but would not decide merits of 
appeal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Shepard, J., dissented. .. ._ 
1. Justices of the Peace <$=• 159(10) 
Since 1975 amendments1 to :Id'aho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which required for the 
first time the filing of a-cost bond within 
ten days in order to perfect 'an a^iyea'Krimi 
magistrates court to district court, were 
unavailable to appellants at time they pre-
pared their pro se appeal,-on July 14/1975, 
from magistrates court to district court, 
district court erred in applying strict re-
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